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COMMENTS
TAX GROSS-UPS: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
ARGUING AND CALCULATING AWARDS FOR
ADVERSE TAX CONSEQUENCES IN
DISCRIMINATION SUITS
Tim Canney+
In 1990, finding that "discrimination against individuals with disabilities
persists in such critical areas as employment,"' Congress passed the Americans
2
with Disabilities Act (ADA). Congress included the remedies provided in
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (1964 CRA) to enforce the ADA.3
Title VII's intentionally broad language allows a court hearing an employment
discrimination case to grant "any other equitable relief' that it deems
"appropriate."4 Courts utilize this power to "make persons whole for injuries
suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination." 5 Yet, there is
disagreement as to how far a court may-and should-extend its equitable
power in these make-whole situations.
6
In a much different area of American law, the United States Constitution
grants Congress the "[p]ower [t]o lay and collect [t]axes, ' '7 both generally and
"on incomes, from whatever source derived."8 Controversy arises when some
perceive that vulnerable members of society receive unfair tax treatment. 9 A
+ J.D. Candidate, May 2011, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.A., 2008, Providence College. The author wishes to thank Professor Robert Destro for his
guidance and invaluable insight throughout the writing process. The author would also like to
thank his family for its unending love, understanding, and support.
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2(a)(3), 104 Stat. 327,
328 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (2006)).
2. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp. 112008)).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (making available the remedies in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to -9 for
violations of the ADA).
4. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g)(l).
5. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975).
6. See infra Part I.A.2.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XV1.
9. See, e.g., Harvey E. Brazer, The Federal Income Tax and the Poor: Where Do We Go
From Here?, 57 CAL. L. REv. 422, 441 (1969) (discussing, in part, how tax exemptions for
dependent children provide the least savings benefits to low-income families); Lawrence Zelenak,
Of Head Taxes, Income Taxes, and Distributive Justice in American Health Care, 69 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 119-20 (2006) (discussing unfair tax treatment in healthcare).
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recent debate has centered on one of the most vulnerable of the taxpaying
citizenry: a middle-aged cancer survivor alleging employment discrimination
under the ADA.'
0
In 1998, Joan Eshelman underwent chemotherapy treatment after being
diagnosed with breast cancer.'" After beating her cancer, Eshelman returned to
work but was eventually fired. 12 Her termination sparked a discrimination
lawsuit that would test the limits of remedies available to plaintiffs alleging
employment discrimination. 13 After Eshelman prevailed at trial, 14 her
employer appealed to the Third Circuit.' 5 The Third Circuit affirmed the jury
lump-sum backpay award-that is, the salary Eshelman would have received
during the time after her termination. 16 The Third Circuit also affirmed the
jury's additional award, known as a "gross-up," used to offset Eshelman's
increased tax liability for receiving a lump sum of several years' backpay. 17 In
so holding, the Third Circuit joined the Tenth Circuit's finding in Sears v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway (Sears II) that tax gross-up awards are
an appropriate use of Title VII's broad equitable provisions to return the
plaintiff to the status quo. 18 The District of Columbia Circuit, however,
determined in an Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) case that
such tax-burden awards are not appropriate remedies within a district court's
discretion.' 9 The split among the circuits as to whether a court can grant Rross-
up awards demonstrates uncertainty over the broad language of Title VII. 0
This Comment examines the development of the remedies available in
modem discrimination suits under Title VII and its statutory progeny. First, it
evaluates the relatively vague and sparse discussion of tax gross-up awards by
10. Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc. (Eshelman I1), 554 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 2009).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 430-32.
13. Seeid. at432.
14. Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc. (Eshelman 1), 397 F. Supp. 2d 557, 575 (E.D. Pa. 2005)
(upholding the jury verdict in favor of Eshelman and denying the defendant's motion for
judgment as a matter of law).
15. Eshelman I1, 554 F.3d at 430.
16. Id. at 441-43; ef HENRY H. PERRITr, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE WORKPLACE § 4.01 [B]
(3d ed. 2001) (discussing remedies available under Title VII, including backpay awards and
judicial interpretation).
17. Eshelman 11, 554 F.3d at 441-43. Courts award tax gross-ups to offset the resulting
increased tax burden incurred by prevailing plaintiffs for lump-sum backpay awards because such
awards are taxable as gross income in the year of payment. See Rev. Rul. 78-336, 1978-2 C.B.
256 (ruling that backpay awarded to a dismissed federal employee was taxable in the year paid).
18. Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. (Sears II), 749 F.2d 1451, 1456 (10th Cir.
1984).
19. Dashnaw v. Pefia, 12 F.3d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (highlighting a lack of case law
and other authority to the contrary of its decision). The differences between the ADA and the
ADEA are inconsequential for purposes of this Comment because the ADEA also includes a
remedial scheme similar to Title VII. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
20. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
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the circuit courts. Then, this Comment draws analogies from other circuit case
law addressing equitable awards, such as prejudgment interest, as well as from
the Supreme Court's elucidation of Title VII's purpose and application. Next,
this Comment argues that the statutory language, congressional intent, and
subsequent interpretation by the Supreme Court makes clear that Title VII's
remedial scheme can include gross-up awards for negative tax consequences as
a means, where appropriate, to make a victim "whole." Finally, this Comment
synthesizes the various district court approaches and offers an approach to
guide practitioners in calculating gross-up awards.
1. THE BROAD LANGUAGE OF TITLE VII AND THE NEED FOR INTERPRETATION
A. Title VII s Inception and Evolution
1. The Civil Rights Act of 1964
After World War II, there was increasing pressure in American politics for
21
civil rights and equality for minorities, particularly for African Ameicans.
Responding to the increased pressure, President John F. Kennedy charged the
Justice Department in June 1963 with drafting legislation designed to eradicate
or remedy such discrimination. 22 On July 2, 1964, President Lyndon B.
Johnson signed the 1964 CRA into law.
23
Title VII of the 1964 CRA prohibits discrimination by employers "against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin." 24 It also established the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and charged the EEOC with enforcing the
provisions of Title VII. 25 The 1964 CRA's primary purpose, and thus the
EEOC's primary task, is to eliminate and remedy employment discrimination
through intervention on behalf of the aggrieved employee.
26
Title VII, however, also allows victims of discrimination to bring civil
actions. 27  Although Congress sought to give victims broad remedies by
28
allowing civil actions, much confusion and uncertainty has developed. Now
21. See CongressLink, Major Features of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
http://www.congresslink.org/print-basics-histmats-civilrights64text.htm#politics (last visited
July 27, 2010) (describing the historical prologue to the 1964 CRA).
22. Id
23. Id.
24. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
25. Id. § 2000e-4.
26. See id. § 2000e-5; see also H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 64-65 (1991), reprinted in
1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 602-03 (explaining the remedial scheme for gender and religious
discrimination).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
28. Compare Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-19 (1975) (discussing the
broad equitable reach of discrimination statutes), with Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d
2010] 1113
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codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g), 29 the equitable-relief provision of the 1964
CRA represents the full breadth of congressional power in providing
appropriate remedies to discrimination plaintiffs. 30 Section 2000e-5(g) allows
federal and state courts applying the 1964 CRA to order injunctions, backpay
awards, employment reinstatement, and, most notably, "any other equitable
relief as the court deems appropriate." 31 The legislative history indicates that
Congress meant to give the courts free reign in fashioning equitable remedies
under Title VII.
32
2. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964's
Remedial Scope
In reviewing awards granted under Title VII of the 1964 CRA, the Supreme
Court gave considerable breadth to the equitable remedies courts could impose
in their judgments. 33 Perhaps the most frequently cited case according
deference to a district court's equitable judgment is Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, which described the purpose of Title VII's remedies as "eradicating
discrimination throughout the economy and making persons whole for injuries
suffered through past discrimination."34 Additionally, the Court was quick to
324, 336 (6th Cir. 1970) (holding that the discharge of an employee who refused to work on the
Sabbath was warranted), aff'd, 392 U.S. 689, 689 (1971) (per curiam).
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
30. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 6549 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey) (outlining the
equitable relief available to plaintiffs who bring a successful Title VII claim).
31. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g)(1).
32. See, e.g., 118 CONG. REC. 7168 (1972) (statement of Sen. Williams) (discussing Title
VII during floor debate of the Equal Opportunity Employment Act of 1972). Senator Harrison
Williams stated that the appropriate relief provision of Title VII was "intended to give the courts
wide discretion exercising their equitable powers to fashion the most complete relief possible."
Id. The framers of Title VII stated that they were using the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) provision authorizing "appropriate affirmative relief' as a model in crafting the remedies
available under Title VII. See 110 CONG. REc. 6549 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); id at
7214 (memorandum of Sens. Clark and Case). Under the NLRA, "[m]aking the workers whole
for losses suffered on account of an unfair labor practice is part of the vindication of the public
policy which the Board enforces." Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197 (1941).
Moreover, the Supreme Court stated in Phelps Dodge that "in applying its authority over backpay
orders, the [National Labor Relations] Board has not used stereotyped formulas but has availed
itself of the freedom given it by Congress to attain just results in diverse, complicated situations."
Id. at 198.
33. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Trans. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 779-80 (1976) (holding that the
1964 CRA's discretionary equitable remedies permitted a court to award seniority rights to
plaintiff). Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co. illustrates the flexibility of Title VII's equitable
remedies, as courts may grant any relief within their "sound equitable discretion." Id. at 769-70.
34. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1973). In Albemarle, African
American plaintiffs alleged discrimination based on company tests for seniority rights. Id. at 409.
In a seven-to-one decision, the Court determined that there is a rebuttable presumption that
successful plaintiffs in Title VII discrimination cases should receive backpay awards. Id. at 422.
[Vol. 59:11111114
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recognize the nature of civil rights litigation and its economic effects on
monetary awards. 35 Thus, in the 1980s, the Supreme Court began approving
equitable measures taken by the lower courts to adjust monetary values of
awards.
36
Albemarle was important in another respect as well; it made backpay awards
the rule, not the exception. 37 Because backpay was so fundamental to Title
VII's make-whole scheme, the Court stated that, "given a finding of unlawful
discrimination, backpay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied
generally, would not frustrate [Title VII's] central statutory purposes."3 In
other instances, the Court did not give a liberal construction, which many
believed to be at the heart of congressional intent, to Title VII.39 In the late
1970s and throughout the 1980s, the Supreme Court limited its interpretation
of the power of courts to enforce Title VII in equity. 40 Congress, recognizing
the im lications of judicial constraint, was forced to prove its intentions once
more.
3. A Continuing Legacy: The Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act
Displeased with the apparent conservatism of the Court's interpretation of
discrimination statutes, 42 Congress recognized that Title VII's remedial scheme
needed to expand to include monetary damages not contemplated under the
original Title VII. 43 In February 1990, Senator Ted Kennedy and
Representative Augustus Hawkins led the vanguard for civil rights reform by
35. Id. at 415-17.
36. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284 (1989) (recognizing an adjustment in
attorneys' fees to compensate for delay in payment); Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens'
Council for Clean Air, 483 U.S. 711, 716 (1987) (recognizing that courts generally compensate
delays in payments by adjusting awards accordingly).
37. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 421-22.
38. Id. at 421; see L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 719 (1978)
(applying the Albemarle presumption of backpay).
39. The Supreme Court was narrowly reading several civil rights statutes to uphold partially
discriminatory practices. See, e.g., Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573-75 (1984)
(holding that a federal sex-discrimination statute applied only to the college's receipt of federal
funds for its financial aid program, so its refusal to execute a school-wide compliance statement
did not warrant revocation of financial aid where discrimination in that specific program was not
shown).
40. Compare Grove City Coll., 465 U.S. at 573-75, with Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 421.
41. See infra Part I.A.3 (discussing the legislative history of Title VII).
42. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 60-66 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,
598-604 (noting Congress's displeasure over recent Supreme Court decisions on discrimination
and the need to expand the scope of civil rights statutes and remedies).
43. See, e.g., id. at 64-65 ("Monetary damages also are necessary to make discrimination
victims whole for the terrible injury to their careers, to their mental and emotional health, and to
their self-respect and dignity.").
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introducing Senate Bill 2104 and House Bill 4000, respectively. 44 The stated
purpose of the bills was "to strengthen existing protections and remedies
available under Federal civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence
and adequate compensation for victims of discrimination." 45 Although largely
similar to the later-enacted Civil Rights Act of 1991, the argument against the
1990 bill was mainly over the employer "disparate-impact" provision, 46 which
critics argued would ultimately lead employers to establish racial quotas in
their hiring.47
President George H. W. Bush indicated his intent to veto the initial version
48of the bill. However, after lawmakers struck a compromise the following
year, he signed the 1991 Civil Rights Act (1991 CRA).49 This expansion of
damages incorporated into the 1991 CRA50 indicates that Congress sought to
increase the means by which courts could make victims of discrimination
whole.51
44. See PERRITr, supra note 16, § 1.02.
45. S. 2104, 101st Cong. § 2 (1990); H.R. 4000, 101st Cong. § 2 (1990).
46. S. 2104 § 4; H.R. 4000 § 4.
47. PERRITT, supra note 16, § 1.02; see GEORGE BUSH, MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF
THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING ALTERNATIVE LANGUAGE TO S. 2104 AS PASSED BY THE
CONGRESS, H.R. DOC. NO. 101-25 1, at 1 (1990) (conveying the President's concern that the bill
would lead to employment quotas based on population statistics).
48. SeeH.R.DOC.NO. 101-251, at 1.
49. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); see also PERRITT, supra note 16, § 1.02. During
floor debate for the amended version of the 1991 CRA, both Democratic and Republican leaders
introduced material in an attempt to add their own party's interpretation for the legislative record.
Compare 137 CONG. REC. 30,661 (1991) (statement of Rep. Edwards) (offering an interpretative
memorandum for the record), with id at 30,677-68 (statement of Rep. Hyde) (submitting
legislative history for the record), and id. at 29,014-15 (statement of Sen. Dole) (speculating that
there would be future debates about the meaning of the provision).
50. See Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 2(1), 105 Stat. at 1071 (stating the congressional finding
that "additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter unlawful harassment and
intentional discrimination in the workplace"); see also PERRITr, supra note 16, §§ 1.01-02
(discussing compensatory and punitive damages additions to Title VII remedies under the 1991
CRA).
51. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (2006) ("Any person aggrieved may bring a civil action in
any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the
purposes of this chapter."); see also CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & LAUREN M. WALTER,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 13.09[C] (4th ed. 2009) (explaining that
when the ADEA was originally enacted, it adopted a remedial scheme similar to Title VII). The
1991 CRA sought to "further align the ADEA with Title VII, which was one of the purposes
underlying the [1991 CRA]." Id. This is consistent with the broad associations made by courts
when discussing discrimination statutes. Cf Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418
(1975) (discussing the make-whole purpose of discrimination statutes generally); Eshelman v.
Agere Sys., Inc. (Eshelman I), 554 F.3d 426, 442 (3d Cir. 2009) ("Our conclusion is driven by
the 'make whole' remedial purpose of the antidiscrimination statutes."); Dashnaw v. Pefia, 12
F.3d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting "the general rule that victims of discrimination should
be made whole").
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The 1991 CRA was not the only reform of discrimination legislation enacted
during the Bush administration. In 1990, the ADA was signed into law "[t]o
establish a clear and comprehensive prohibition of discrimination on the basis
of disability. ' 52 The ADA, rather than enacting its own remedial structure,
adopted outright the remedies utilized by the 1964 CRA.53 In 1991, Congress
amended the ADA to allow for compensatory and punitive damages in limited
circumstances. 54 Thus, claimants under the ADA face the same challenges ascivil rights claimants in securing certain forms of equitable relief.55
4. Backpay and Prejudgment Interest Awards: Salary and Then Some
In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, the Supreme Court established a
presumption of backpay when a plaintiff proves discrimination. 56 For many
plaintiffs, backpay encompasses far more than just their previous salaries, and
can include expected tips, lost bonuses, and overtime pay.57 In short, backpay
compensation includes "all economic benefits that the plaintiff would have
received from the employer, whether directly or indirectly, but for the
employer's discriminatory conduct. 58 Consequently, courts are faced with the
complex task of calculating the total economic benefits a slaintiff-employee
would be entitled to had the discrimination never occurred. Generally, there
are four steps in calculating appropriate backpay in Title VII cases: (1)
determining the plaintiffs probable employment history absent discrimination;
(2) fixing the period of time where backpay should apply; (3) determining
additional pecuniary interests other than lost salary or wages and the amounts
52. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006 & Supp. 112008)).
53. 42U.S.C. § 12117.
54. See Civil Rights Act of 1990 § 102(a)(2), 105 Stat. at 1072 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(a)(2)) (providing compensatory and punitive damages under the ADA when an employer
engages in unlawful intentional discrimination); see also PERRITT, supra note 16, § 1.05[D]. If
an employer can show that it tried to make reasonable accommodations to disabled employees, it
may not be liable for compensatory or punitive damages under the ADA amendments. 42 U.S.C.
§ 12113; see PERRITT, supra note 16, § 1.05[D].
55. See Caprice L. Roberts, Ratios, (Ir)Rationality and Civil Rights Punitive Awards, 39
AKRON L. REV. 1019, 1026 (2006) (discussing obstacles facing civil rights plaintiffs for both
proof and remedies).
56. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975).
57. See SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 51, § 13.09[B][4].
58. Id.; see Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546, 1562 (11 th Cir. 1986).
59. See, e.g., Pappas v. Watson Wyatt & Co., No. 3:04CV304, 2008 WL 45385, at *12-13
(D. Conn. Jan. 2, 2008) (denying a tax gross-up on a complex calculation of COBRA payments);
EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1372 & n.10 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (noting that
backpay would include lost tips and bonuses calculable by averaging the performances of other
employees).
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of such interests; and (4) reducing the award when the plaintiff fails to mitigate
the damage or other factors require the award to be reduced.60
Often, a "fifth step" 61 in calculating an equitable backpay award is
62determining prejudgment interest, the interest accruing on a backpay award.
In at least one circuit, courts calculate prejudgment interest on backpay awards
incrementally as it accrues rather than on the final lump sum.63 Courts employ
various interest-rate tables to calculate the appropriate interest awards in
different cases. 6 4  As a result, the calculations are often complex and require
submissions from economic experts.
65
The language of Title VII does not mention prejudgment interest, leaving it
to the courts to determine if the awards fit into the statute's "make-whole"
scheme. Despite this discretion, courts have almost unanimously agreed that
Title VII permits awards of prejudgment interest. 66 The Supreme Court, noting
60. SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra note 51, § 13.09[B][1]. It is important to note that Title
VII specifically requires that courts reduce awards based on "[i]nterim earnings or amounts
earnable with reasonable diligence." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(l) (2006). Thus, if plaintiffs work
to mitigate backpay damages as the statute directs, they will be taxed for wages earned during
years actually worked at one effective rate, but taxed on the lump-sum backpay award at a
different, usually higher, rate. See infra notes 217-22.
61. See Anthony E. Rothschild, Comment, Prejudgment Interest: Survey and Suggestion, 77
NW. U. L. REV. 192, 192-93 (1982). While these awards are commonplace and thus constitute a
"fifth step" of a backpay award calculation, prejudgment interest itself is truly a separate award.
62. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 85 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 623.
The House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor found that,
as a general rule, successful plaintiffs in civil actions who receive monetary relief-
back pay as well as attorneys' fees-are entitled to prejudgment interest on such relief
to compensate recipients for the delay in payment. The principle is a simple one:
money received later is worth less than money received now.
Id.
63. Reed v. Mineta, 438 F.3d 1063, 1067 (10th Cir. 2006); see SULLIVAN & WALTER, supra
note 51, § 13.11.
64. See, e.g., Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1566 (3d Cir. 1996) (using IRS-
adjusted prime rate); Gelof v. Papineau, 829 F.2d 452, 456 (3d Cir. 1987) (using state-judgment
rate); Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F.2d 593, 602 (1st Cir. 1987) (using federal judgment
rate to calculate prejudgment interest). But see United States v. City of Warren, 138 F.3d 1083,
1096 (6th Cir. 1998) ("[M]erely adjusting the dollars the plaintiff would have earned to
compensate for diminished earning power because of inflation does not compensate for the lost
use of the money in the intervening time.").
65. See, e.g., Plaintiffs Motion to Mold Verdict to Include Prejudgment Interest &
Damages Resulting from Tax Consequences at Ex. A, Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc., No. Civ. A.
03-CV-1814 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 18, 2005) (including an affidavit from the plaintiffs forensic
economic expert calculating the prejudgment interest of the plaintiff's damages award).
66. See Green v. USX Corp., 843 F.2d 1511, 1530 (3d Cir. 1988); Conway, 825 F.2d at 602;
United States v. Gregory, 818 F.2d 1114, 1118 (4th Cir. 1987); Nagy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 773
F.2d 1190 (t tth Cir. 1985); Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 727 F.2d 473, 478 (5th
Cir. 1984); Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429, 1446 (9th Cir. 1984), remanded
and modified on other grounds, 742 F.2d 520 (1984); EEOC v. Wooster Brush Co. Employees
Relief Ass'n, 727 F.2d 566, 578-79 (6th Cir. 1984); Washington v. Kroger Co., 671 F.2d 1072,
1078 (8th Cir. 1982); Taylor v. Philips Indus., Inc., 593 F.2d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 1979).
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this agreement, later affirmed "that Title VII authorizes prejudgment interest as
part of the backpay remedy in suits against private employers."6 7 However,
after the Supreme Court held that prejudgment interest was not specifically
authorized against governmental entities,6 8 Congress amended Title VII to
waive sovereign immunity. 69 This short history of the prejudgment interest
award shows how judicial interpretation may define the manifestations of
Congress's make-whole intent under Title VII.
B. The Tax Man Cometh: Discrimination Awards and the Internal Revenue
Code
Damages awards in discrimination cases have received oscillating treatment
under the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.). 7 1 At times, the Internal Revenue
72Service (IRS) exempted punitive damages from gross-income calculations.
Congress then changed direction and taxed punitive damages7 3 Although the
74I.R.C. exempts from taxation damages awards for personal physical injuries,
whether as a lump sum or periodic payments, it does not exclude most
damages awards for discrimination.7 5 The Supreme Court and Congress have
repeatedly reaffirmed this view. 76 Even contingent attorneys' fees awards are
67. Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 557 (1988). The Court went on to state that
"[p]rejudgment interest, of course, is 'an element of complete compensation."' Id. at 558
(quoting West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 310 (1987)); see Rothschild, supra note
61, at 195-99 (discussing early attitudes toward prejudgment interest awards). It is important to
realize that the Supreme Court's holding in Loeffler explicitly applies to claims brought against
private employers. See infra Part lII.A (discussing Title VII remedies against government
employers without an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity).
68. See Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 319 (1986), abrogated in part by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) (2006) ("The provisions of section 2000e-5(f) through (k) of
this title, as applicable, shall govern civil actions brought hereunder, and the same interest to
compensate for delay in payment shall be available as in cases involving nonpublic parties.").
70. Loeffler, 486 U.S. at 558.
71. See Foster v. United States, 249 F.3d 1275, 1278-81 (11 th Cir. 2001) (discussing cases
where courts have exempted, and then allowed, gross-income calculations on punitive damages
awards), overruled on other grounds by Comm'r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 429-39 (2005).
72. See Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47 (exempting punitive damages under I.R.C. §
104(a)(2) from gross income).
73. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1605, 110 Stat.
1755, 1838 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (2006)) (adding a "physical" requirement
and punitive-damages provision to I.R.C. § 104(a)(2)).
74. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
75. See Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-2 C.B. 6-7; United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 242
(1992), modified on other grounds by § 1605, 110 Stat. at 1838.
76. See Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 336-37 (1995), modifiedon other grounds by §
1605, 110 Stat. at 1838; Burke, 504 U.S. at 242. In Burke, the Court decided the taxability issue
under the 1964 CRA and, focusing on the nature of the remedies in Title VII, concluded that
those remedies did not befit a "tort-like 'personal injury"' for purposes of § 104(a)(2) exclusion.
Catholic University Law Review
generally taxable as income to prevailing plaintiffs in discrimination suits. 77
Not surprisingly, the tax consequences of large backpay awards can be
78particularly harsh on plaintiffs. The current ruling of the IRS is that backpay
awards received under Title VII are not excludable from gross income and are
considered "wages" or "compensation" under various applicable tax statutes.79
The result is that lump-sum backpay awards constitute "income" and "wages"
in the year in which the award is paid; therefore, such awards are taxable at
81that time. In prolonged litigation, an award for several years of backpay
could increase the plaintiff's tax liability by thousands of dollars.82 Moreover,
provisions in the I.R.C. allowing for income-averaging, which permit plaintiffs
Burke, 504 U.S. at 238. However, the Court based its conclusion on the fact that Title VII
remedies did not include compensatory or punitive damages, which it viewed as vital for tort-type
damages to be excludable under § 104. Id. at 238-39. Although the 1991 CRA made punitive
and compensatory damages available as Title VII remedies, see PERRTT, supra note 16, § 1.02,
Congress amended § 104(a)(2) to require "physical" injury or sickness in order to be excluded. §
1605(a), 110 Stat. at 1838. Thus, whatever the state of the law between 1991 and 1996, it is clear
that Congress does not currently wish to exclude backpay awards from taxation.
77. Comm'r v. Banks, 543 U.S. 426, 430 (2005) ("We hold that, as a general rule, when a
litigant's recovery constitutes income, the litigant's income includes the portion of the recovery
paid to the attorney as a contingent fee."). But see I.R.C. § 62(a)(20) (allowing for above-the-line
deductions of attorneys' fees awarded in discrimination suits).
78. See, e.g., Eshelman v. Agere Sys. Inc. (Eshelman 11), 554 F.3d 426, 441-42 (3d Cir.
2009) (noting that lump-sum backpay would increase a plaintiffs tax liability by several thousand
dollars); see also discussion infra Part III.C.
79. Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-2 C.B. 6 (interpreting Title VII as applied to the ADA). Backpay
awards under Title VII are "wages" under numerous statutory provisions. See I.R.C. §§ 3121(a),
3306(b), 3401(a). In other contexts, the IRS seems equally ready to classify such awards as
"compensation." Rev. Rul. 96-65, 1996-2 C.B. 6 (citing I.R.C. § 3306). The IRS reasons that
such awards are "completely independent of' personal physical injuries or physical sickness, and
such awards are thus not "damages received on account of' these injuries. Id; see I.R.C. §
104(a)(2); Hukkanen-Campbell v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M. (CCH) 2122, 2125 (2000).
80. See Tanaka v. Dep't of Navy, 788 F.2d 1552, 1553 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Rev.
Rul. 78-336, 1978-2 C.B. 255; see also United States v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S.
200, 204 (2001) (holding that backpay is taxable in the year paid for certain purposes). However,
backpay awards are treated as wages for the years in which the wages should have been paid with
regards to social-security benefits treatment. Tanaka, 788 F.2d at 1553.
81. Cleveland Indians, 532 U.S. at 204. It is important to note that Congress has
consistently failed to enact legislation introduced to offset or eliminate the negative tax
consequences of lump-sum backpay awards under Title VII and similar statutes. See infra note
202 and accompanying text (discussing the Civil Rights Tax Relief Act (CRTRA)). The effect of
congressional inaction can be particularly devastating when treasury regulations address a statute.
The Court has noted that "'Treasury regulations and interpretations long continued without
substantial change, applying to unamended or substantially reenacted statutes, are deemed to have
received congressional approval and have the effect of law."' Cleveland Indians, 532 U.S. at 220
(quoting Cottage Savings Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 561 (1991)). Thus, in the absence of
congressional action, courts are forced to create equitable remedies that do not impinge upon the
myriad of tax regulations surrounding discrimination awards.
82. See, e.g., Eshelman I1, 554 F.3d at 441; Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
(Sears I1), 749 F.2d 1451, 1456 (10th Cir. 1984); Loesch v. City of Phila., No. 05-cv-0578, 2008
WL 2557429, at * II (E.D. Pa. June 19, 2008).
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to spread lump-sum awards out over several taxable years, provide little, if
any, relief 83 Thus, courts are left with the responsibility of creating equitable
alternatives, because Congress has not passed legislation to alleviate the
problem.
8 4
C. The Circuit Courts Address the Issue
1. The Tenth Circuit's Recognition of Gross-Ups
In Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, Joe Sears filed a
discrimination claim under the 1964 CRA against the Atchison, Topeka, &
Santa Fe Railway Company and what would later become the United85
Transportation Union. His suit, a class action filed on behalf of train porters,
alleged that a segregated job structure existed between predominantly' white
brakemen and African American porters, in violation of Title VII. 6 The
district court held for the class. After the Tenth Circuit remanded the case for
the district court to fashion a remedy for the entire class, the district court
ordered seniority and backpay relief, attorneys' fees, and a composite tax
gross-up.88 The defendants appealed and contested the gross-up, but the Tenth
Circuit held that Title VII authorized the award in limited circumstances.
89
The court found that this class met those limited circumstances due to the
protracted nature of the litigation.
90
In examining the propriety of the district court's gross-up award, the Tenth
Circuit first noted that the award covered seventeen years of backpay. 91
Additionally, the court reasoned that the amounts involved "will likely place
the living members of the class in the highest income tax bracket.' 92 Thus,
while a provision existed in the I.R.C. allowing discrimination plaintiffs to
83. See Sears I, 749 F.2d at 1456 (noting that even if plaintiffs in a class-action suit
income-averaged their awards, they would still be in the highest tax bracket); see also infra note
202.
84. See supra note 81 (addressing congressional inaction and IRS regulations).
85. Sears II, 749 F.2d at 1453. Sears initially filed his complaint with the EEOC, as
required by statute, and initiated his civil suit in district court upon obtaining a right-to-sue letter
from the EEOC. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.; Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. (Sears 1), No. W-4963, 1982 WL 500, at
*4-8 (D. Kan. Dec. 1, 1982). The Tenth Circuit described the award as "composite" because
several members of the class had predeceased the decision, so income and estate taxes had to be
considered. Sears 11, 749 F.2d at 1456.
89. Sears II, 749 F.2d at 1456.
90. Id. Specifically, the court found that the plaintiffs were entitled to a "tax component" as
part of their backpay awards to offset the tax liability that necessarily comes with receiving a
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average their income, 93 the court found that the provision would provide
insufficient relief for the plaintiffs due to the sheer size of their sums.
9 4
Moreover, the fact that many class members were deceased supported the
district court's tax gross-up.95 Unlike the tax provision allowing for income-
averaging, no such provision existed for the deceased taxpayers' estates.
96
Because nearly forty percent of the class members had died prior to the
decision, the Tenth Circuit held that awarding the class an amount to offset its
substantial negative tax liability was "an appropriate exercise of [the district
court's] discretion. 97 The court did note, however, that such awards "may not
be appropriate in a typical Title VII case." 98 Thus, whether courts in the Tenth
Circuit award tax gross-ups depends on whether the facts in the case warrant
such a remedy.
2. The District of Columbia Circuit. Setting Precedent?
In 1982, Francis Dashnaw retired from his position at the Federal Maritime
Administration (MARAD), a division of the Department of Transportation,
before judicial resolution of his age discrimination claim under the ADEA. 99
In 1986, he claimed that his retirement was forced upon him as a "constructive
discharge" because MARAD repeatedly promoted younger candidates instead
of him.W° In 1992, nearly fifteen years after his initial complaint, the district
court found that Dashnaw was indeed a victim of age discrimination under the
ADEA and that he was constructively discharged from his position.' 0 ' The
district court then ordered that Dashnaw be reinstated at an increased pay grade
and that he receive backpay reflecting the promotions he was improperly
denied. °2 The government appealed the decision, arguing that the claims were
93. Id. (citing I.R.C. § 1302(c)( 2 ) (1982) (repealed 1986)).
94. See id.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.1303-1(a) (1983)). The present l.R.C. has no income-
averaging provisions available for living taxpayers; therefore, if decided today, this case would
presumably still reach the same conclusion for tax gross-up awards. However, scholars debate
the effectiveness of income-averaging provisions in the I.R.C. Compare Lily L. Batchfelder,
Taxing the Poor: Income Averaging Reconsidered, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 395, 404-06 (2003)
(arguing that the poor benefit substantially more from income-averaging than the rich), with
Robert Schmalbeck, Income Averaging After Twenty Years: A Failed Experiment in Horizontal
Equity, 1984 DUKE L.J. 509, 578 (1984) (arguing that because income-averaging is unnecessary
and actually benefits the wealthy, Congress should be applauded for curtailing its use).
97. Sears II at 1457.
98. Id. at 1456.
99. Dashnaw v. Pefia, 12 F.3d 1112, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
100. Id. at 1113-14.
101. Id. at 1113-15.
102. Id. at 1114-15. Since the court determined that Dashnaw was constructively
discharged, he was also awarded backpay for the years following his departure from MARAD.
Id. at 1115.
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untimely.10 3 Dashnaw countered by filing cross-claims alleging, among other
things, that the district court should have granted a tax gross-up award.10
In deciding the case, the District of Columbia Circuit alluded to the
similarities among the federal discrimination statutes.105 Accordingly, the
court's discussion of Dashnaw's tax claim did not specifically reference the
ADEA's remedial scheme. Rather, the court broadly held, "Absent an
arrangement by voluntary settlement of the parties, the general rule that
victims of discrimination should be made whole does not support 'gross-ups'
of backpay to cover tax liability. We know of no authority for such relief, and,
appellee points to none."'10 6 Thus, the court was unwilling to extend the award
to Dashnaw due to a lack of support.
10 7
In 2007, the District of Columbia Circuit was again presented with the issue
of tax gross-ups in Fogg v. Gonzales (Fogg IV). 108 Matthew Fogg was
employed by the United States Marshal Service (USMS) and alleged
discrimination based on race after being denied promotions, stripped of his
duties, and eventually terminated. 109 At trial, a jury found that the USMS had
discriminated against Fogg in violation of 1991 CRA and awarded Fogg, in
part, backpay for the decade-long discrimination. 110 On remand after
subsequent appeal,11 the district court awarded Fogg a tax gross-up on his
backpay award, referencing the Tenth Circuit's decision in Sears 11.112 The
District of Columbia Circuit, however, disallowed the award, citing its
"binding circuit precedent" in Dashnaw.
113
3. The Third Circuit and Eshelman
In 1981, Joan Eshelman began her career with what would eventually
become Agere Systems, Inc.1 14 Eshelman distinguished herself at work11 5 and
103. Id.
104. Id. at 116.
105. See id. at 1115 (treating the constructive discharge issue using Title VII analysis, in
which constructive discharge yields recovery for the claimant) (citing Clark v. Marsh, 665 F.2d
1168, 1172 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
106. Id. at 1116.
107. Id.
108. Fogg v. Gonzales (Fogg IV), 492 F.3d 447, 455-56 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
109. Id. at 449-50. Specifically, Fogg alleged that twice he had been denied a performance
evaluation necessary for his scheduled GS pay-grade increase, and that he had been reprimanded
and effectively demoted. Id. at 450.
110. Fogg v. Gonzalez (Fogg ll), 407 F. Supp. 2d 79, 83 (D.D.C. 2005).
Ill. Fogg v. Ashcroft (Fogg 11), 254 F.3d 103, 111 (D.C. Cir. 2001), afjfd in part and denied
in part, Fogg IV, 492 F.3d at 456.
112. FoggIV,492 F.3d at 456.
113. Id. (citing Dashnaw v. Pefia, 12 F.3d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
114. Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc. (Eshelman I1), 554 F.3d 426, 430 (3d Cir. 2009).
115. Id. at 431 (discussing Eshelman's excellent performance evaluations both before and
during her illness).
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received several promotions, culminating in her position as supervisor of the
company's Chief Information Office in Pennsylvania." 6 However, in 1998,
Eshelman was diagnosed with breast cancer and took several months' leave
from work, eventually returning on a part-time basis." 7 Because of her
chemo-therapy treatments, Eshelman suffered from short-term memory
deficiencies and required accommodations.' 18 On December 30, 2001, Joan
Eshelman was laid off, and she subsequently initiated a lawsuit under the
ADA.
19
At trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that Agere had discriminated
against Eshelman on the basis of her disability and awarded her "$170,000 in
back pay and $30,000 in compensatory damages." 120 On appeal, Agere
argued, in part, that the district court erred in awarding Eshelman an additional
tax gross-up on her backpay award. 121 Specifically, Agere contended that
"there [was] no statutory or case law that supports this aspect of the District
Court's decision."'' 22 The Third Circuit disagreed, and allowed the award.
123
The court noted, however, the disagreement between the Tenth and District of
Columbia Circuits, and accordingly offered detailed support for its decision to
allow backpay gross-ups for Title VII and ADA plaintiffs.
1 24
The Third Circuit began its analysis of gross-ups by examining the purpose
of Title VII remedies.' 25 The court cited Supreme Court decisions supporting
its interpretation that the main purpose of Title VII "equitable" relief is to
make victims whole.1 26 The court also noted that Congress bestowed upon the
district courts the full scope of congressional power to implement the make-
whole purpose of Title VII. 27 According to the Third Circuit, reaching a just
result requires courts to restore prevailing plaintiffs to an "'economic status
quo"' as much as possible.'
28
Determining that Title VII gives courts wide latitude in fashioning equitable
relief, the Third Circuit next examined why tax gross-ups are necessary at
116. Id. at 430.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 430-31.
119. Id. at 432. Eshelman also attempted to assert an age discrimination claim under the
ADEA, but was unsuccessful. Id.
120. Id.; see infra note 163 (discussing Seventh Amendment issues presented by additur to
jury awards).
121. Eshelman 1, 554 F.3d at 432-33.
122. Id at 440; cf Dashnaw v. Pefia, 12 F.3d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("We know ofno
authority for such relief, and appellee points to none. Given the complete lack of support in
existing case law for tax gross-ups, we decline so to extend the law in this case.").
123. Eshelman 11, 554 F.3d at 442-43.
124. Id. at441-42.
125. Id. at 440.
126. Id. (citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418 (1975)).
127. Id.
128. Id. (quoting In re Continental Airlines, 125 F.3d 120, 135 (3d Cir 1997)).
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all. 129 The court noted that backpay awards are taxable, 130 and that the taxes
apply for the year the plaintiff receives the award.' 3' Faced with the question
of whether a district court could grant equitable relief for the tax burden, the
Third Circuit surveyed case law and held that tax gross-ups are within a district
court's Title VII power. Accordingly, the Third Circuit now faced the question
of whether a district court could grant equitable relief for the tax burden.1
32
The court based support for its decision largely on a comparison of tax gross-
ups to prejudgment interest awards, concluding that both awards serve similar
purposes. Accordingly, because of the "now-universal acceptance" of
prejudgment interest awards, courts should be able to award tax gross-ups in
appropriate cases. 34
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit was quick to limit its holding, stating that its
opinion "d[id] not suggest that a prevailing plaintiff in discrimination cases is
presumptively entitled to an additional [tax gross-up]." 135 Rather, courts
should consider the propriety of tax gross-ups "'in light of the circumstances
peculiar to the case. "6In Eshelman v. Agere Systems, Inc. (Eshelman 11), the
court pointed to the undisputed affidavit submitted by Eshelman's economic
expert calculating her tax consequences because of the lump-sum backpay
award, as well as the past tax returns she filed for the years in question.
1 37
Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that, given the evidence, the district court
did not abuse its discretion in awarding Eshelman an additional amount.
1 38
D. The Other Circuits: Are Tax Gross-Ups on the Horizon?
1. The Eighth Circuit: Suggestive Reasoning
Although no other circuit has squarely decided the issue, the Eighth Circuit
previewed what may be on the horizon in Hukkanen v. International Union of
129. Id. at 441.
130. Id.
131. Id. ("[R]eceipt of a lump sum back pay award could lift an employee into a higher tax
bracket for that year, meaning the employee would have a greater tax burden than if she were to
have received that same pay in the normal course."); see Robinson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 982
F.2d 892, 898 (3d Cir. 1993); see also supra Part I.B.
132. Eshelman II, 554 F.3d at 441-42.
133. Id. at 442. The court explained that tax gross-ups and prejudgment interest awards
"represent[] the recognition that the harm to a prevailing plaintiffs pecuniary interest may be
broader in scope than just a loss of back pay." Id.
134. Id. (citing Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 557 (1988)).
135. Id. at443.
136. Id. (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 424 (1975)).
137. Id. at 442-43; Plaintiffs Motion to Mold Verdict to Include Prejudgment Interest &
Damages Resulting from Tax Consequences, supra note 65, at Ex. A.
138. Eshelman II, 554 F.3d at 442-43. The district court, basing its award off Eshelman's
expert, granted an additional $6,893 to Eshelman. Id. The precise amount of the award is
indicative of the specificity required by the district court, and upheld by the Third Circuit, as to
calculable, unambiguous damages. Id. at 443.
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Operating Engineers.139 There, Nancy Hukkanen resigned from her position at
the International Union of Operating Engineers after alleged lewd acts by her
supervisor, including an armed threat of rape. 140 Hukkanen then brought an
action under Title VII claiming constructive discharge due to gender
discrimination.' 4 1 In reviewing the district court's denial of a tax gross-up
under Title VII, the Eighth Circuit answered only whether denial of a gross-up
was proper in that case, and avoided the question of whether such awards were
generally authorized by Title VII. 142 Below, the district court denied a tax
gross-up for Hukkanen's backpay award because she had "failed to present
evidence of the enhancement's amount or a convenient way for the court to
calculate the amount at the time the court announced its judgment."'' 43 On
appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding only that the district court's denial
was not an abuse of discretion based on the lack of appropriate evidence.'
44
The Eighth Circuit's holding, then, suggests that if a district court has adequate
proof of negative tax liability incurred because of a backpay award, the power
to grant such an award would be within its discretion. The issue in Hukkanen
was the plaintiff's factual showing, not the equitable remedy itself.
Four years after Hukkanen, the Eighth Circuit assessed the propriety of a tax
gross-up awarded against the federal government in Arneson v. Callahan.
145
Stephen Arneson alleged wrongful discharge from his position at the Social
Security Administration in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 146
because of a neurological disorder.' 47 After Arneson prevailed at trial on his
claim and received a backpay award, the district court awarded a tax gross-up
on his backpay.148 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's
award based on a sovereign immunity rationale, commenting that "[t]he mere
fact that Congress intended that discrimination victims receive a full measure
of back pay does not amount to an unequivocal and express waiver of
sovereign immunity.' 49 Seemingly recognizing that "a full measure of back
pay" may include a tax gross-up, the Eighth Circuit went on to say that if tax
gross-ups are authorized under Title VII, the awards are "analogous to the
139. Hukkanen v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 3 F.3d 281, 284 (8th Cir. 1993).
140. Id. at 283-84.
141. Id. at 284.
142. See id. at 286.
143. Id at 287.
144. Id. Hukkanen then tried, unsuccessfully, to exclude the award and deduct attorneys'
fees from her income tax for the award year. See Hukkanen-Campbell v. Comm'r, 79 T.C.M.
(CCH) 2122, 2126 (2000).
145. Arneson v. Callahan, 128 F.3d 1243, 1245-46 (8th Cir. 1997).
146. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2006). Section 794a(a)(l) incorporates and adopts the remedies
available under Title VII of the 1964 CRA. Id. § 794a(a)(1).
147. Arneson, 128 F.3d at 1244-45. Arneson suffered from apraxia, a condition that affected
his ability to focus. Id. at 1245.
148. Id. at 1247.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
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prejudgment interest remedy . . .as an element of making persons whole for
discrimination injuries." '50 Ultimately, because Congress had expressly
authorized prejudgment interest awards against the government,' 5 the court
concluded that a tax gross-up was not appropriate in this case because
Congress had not expressly provided for it. 
152
2. Other District Courts. Similarly Split
The issue of proof has been critical in district court decisions addressing tax
gross-ups.153 For example, in O'Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., the District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that a plaintiff had
adequately proven her negative tax liability for her backpay award and a tax
gross-up was therefore proper. 154 After prevailing in the case and receiving
frontpay, backpay, liquidated damages, and compensatory damages, the
plaintiff argued for a tax gross-up for the entire award. 55 However, the district
court held that only the backpay and frontpay awards merited tax gross-ups.
156
Nevertheless, because the court had precise figures before it-offered into
evidence by the plaintiff-the court was able to calculate the exact amount of
increased tax liability for the plaintiff and awarded that amount as a tax gross-157
up. The district court reasoned that it was not about how much the
employee receives from the backpay award because "[t]he goal ... is to allow
[the] plaintiff to keep the same amount of money as if he had not been
unlawfully terminated.' ' 158 Therefore, tax gross-ups were appropriate.
In the sex-discrimination context, the District Court for the Southern District
of Florida said in EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab that "a district court, in the
exercise of its discretion, may include a tax component in a lump-sum back
pay award to compensate prevailing Title VII plaintiffs."'159 Like in O'Neill,
the Joe's Stone Crab court noted that tax gross-up awards were part of the
prevailing practice in discrimination settlement agreements and within the
power of the district courts to award. 16  However, the court held that the
150. Id. (citation omitted).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d) (2006) (allowing for prejudgment interest awards against
government defendants).
152. Arneson, 128 F.3d at 1247; see discussion infra Part III.A. I.
153. See Argue v. David Davis Enters., Inc., No. 02-9521, 2009 WL 750197, at *26-27 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 20, 2009); Loesch v. City of Phila., No. 05-cv-0578, 2008 WL 2557429, at * II (E.D. Pa.
June 19, 2008); O'Neill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 443, 446 (E.D. Pa. 2000);
EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 1998).




158. Id. at 447.
159. EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 1998).
160. Id.
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EEOC failed to offer adequate evidence enabling the court to make an
appropriate calculation, and it consequently declined to award tax gross-ups.
6 1
This case arguably stands for the proposition that a tax gross-up award
requires a level of proof of precise calculability similar to that implied by the
Eighth Circuit. 162 It appears that only two federal courts have held that tax
gross-ups are beyond the equitable powers granted the judiciary under Title
VII. 163
II. "ANY OTHER RELIEF": THE CIRCUITS' RESPONSE TO THE ADVERSE TAX
CONSEQUENCES OF LUMP-SUM BACKPAY AWARDS
A. A Reasoned Approach: The Tenth and Third Circuits Find a Basis for Tax
Gross-Ups
1. The Tenth Circuit Approach: Nothing Prevents Tax Gross-Ups
The Tenth Circuit squarely faced the issue of whether Title VII's remedial
scope could include tax gross-ups in Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway (Sears I), and held that such awards were indeed authorized by the
161. Id
162. Compare id. ("[T]he EEOC failed to provide sufficient competent foundation evidence
to permit the court to make these calculations."), with Hukkanen v. Int'l Union of Operating
Eng'rs, 3 F.3d 281, 287 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that the plaintiff had "failed to produce evidence
of the enhancement's amount or a convenient way for the court to calculate the amount at the
time the court announced its judgment"). For a discussion of proof and calculation issues, see
infra Part III.C (discussing proof and calculation issues).
163. See Dashnaw v. Pefia, 12 F.3d 1112, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Best v. Shell Oil Co., 4
F. Supp. 2d 770, 776 (N.D. Ill. 1998). The discussion in Best v. Shell Oil Co. is even sparser than
Dashnaw-perhaps because it cites Dashnaw as authority. Best, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 776. The Best
court simply stated, "The case authorities support Shell's objection." Id.
Another district court case denied a tax gross-up not on Title VII grounds, but on
constitutional grounds. Kelley v. City of Albuquerque, No. CIV 03-507, 2006 WL 1304954, at
*1, *6 (D.N.M. Mar. 31, 2006) (denying the award because of the Seventh Amendment's
prohibition against additur in federal cases); see U.S. CONST. amend. VII. An exception to this
constitutional prohibition exists, however, "where the jury has found the underlying liability and
there is no genuine issue as to the correct amount of damages." EEOC v. Massey Yardley
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 117 F.3d 1244, 1252 (11 th Cir. 1997); cf Decato v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
379 F.2d 796, 799 (1st Cir. 1967) ("Just because a party chooses to litigate does not necessarily
mean that there is a dispute as to damages.").
Courts deciding tax gross-ups usually do not address the Seventh Amendment's additur
prohibition, perhaps because similar claims against interest awards on verdicts have failed. See,
e.g., Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 125 F.2d 820, 826 (3d Cir. 1942) (holding that
augmenting a jury verdict to include an additional amount awarded as interest did not violate the
additur prohibition when the award was authorized by statute, regardless of whether the jury was
so instructed). Following this logic, it is arguable that because a court finds that interest awards
and tax gross-ups are authorized under Title VII, disputes over calculations do not warrant a new
jury trial where liability has been found and backpay already awarded.
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statute. 64 In Sears 11, the court based its reasoning, at least in part, on the
broad interpretation that the Supreme Court gave to Title VII remedies.
165
Regrettably, the Tenth Circuit did not elucidate its reasoning beyond citing
these Supreme Court decisions.' 66 In upholding the tax gross-up award, the
court was quick to note that such tax awards may not be appropriate in
ordinary Title VII cases, which suggests that the particular adverse tax
consequences facing these plaintiffs made the award appropriate in this case.
1 6 7
Therefore, plaintiffs in the Tenth Circuit should offer evidence of the propriety
of tax gross-ups given their particular circumstances, 168 as well as evidence ofthe calculated amount of such awards.1 69
2. The Third Circuit: Look at Everything, Then Decide
In 2009, the Third Circuit in Eshelman v. Agere Systems, Inc. (Eshelman I1)
joined the Tenth Circuit's holdinp in Sears II that tax gross-ups were available
to prevailing Title VII plaintiffs. The Third Circuit had previously noted in
an en banc decision that, in fashioning a remedy under Title VII, a court should
create an award that "most closely approximates the conditions that would
have prevailed in the absence of discrimination. 17 1 In Eshelman II, the court
extended this principle and authorized tax gross-ups for backpay awards in
discrimination cases.
72
The Third Circuit went into much greater detail on the propriety of tax
gross-ups than did the Tenth Circuit.173 The Third Circuit recognized that "the
164. Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. (Sears I), 749 F.2d 1451, 1456 (10th Cir.
1984).
165. See id. (citing Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 U.S. 219, 230 (1982); Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 364 (1977)).
166. See id The court did not, for example, cite other equitable remedies granted by courts
in discrimination cases, such as prejudgment interest awards. Compare Eshelman v. Agere Sys.,
Inc. (Eshelman If), 554 F.3d 426, 442 (3d Cir. 2009), and Ameson v. Callahan, 128 F.3d 1243,
1247 (8th Cir. 1997), with Sears II, 749 F.2d at 1456. Rather, the court's somewhat cursory
discussion of the remedial powers granted to courts under Title VII leaves courts expansive
powers to fashion creative awards as they find appropriate. Id.
167. Sears II, 749 F.2d at 1456. The "protracted nature of the litigation" led to a backpay
award so large that much of it would be taxed in the highest tax bracket. Id Further, the court
noted that the tax provisions in existence at the time would only allow the plaintiffs to average
their awarded income over three years, and in the case of deceased plaintiffs, the estate tax in
existence did not provide for income-averaging; therefore, the tax gross-up award was warranted.
Id.
168. See id.
169. See discussion infra Part III.C (addressing appropriate evidence and calculations for tax
gross-ups).
170. Eshelman II, 554 F.3d at 441-42.
171. Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1565-66 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).
172. Eshelman II, 554 F.3d at 441-42.
173. Compare id. at 442 (discussing other types of equitable remedies adopted by courts in
Title VII awards), with Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. (Sears 11), 749 F.2d 1451, 1456
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harm to a prevailing employee's pecuniary interest may be broader in scope
than just a loss of back pay."' 174 The district courts, according to this approach,
have the broad authority under Title VII to fashion a remedy "to achieve
complete restoration of the prevailing employee's economic status quo."'
7 5
The Third Circuit pointed to the Supreme Court's acquiescence to prejudgment
interest awards as evidence that other monetary awards may be necessary to
accomplish the make-whole scheme of Title VII's remedies. The Eshelman
H court also noted that these awards may not be appropriate in all
circumstances, and courts must look to the facts of the case and the evidence
offered by the plaintiff when determining tax gross-up awards.
77
B. The District of Columbia and Eighth Circuits: Closed Doors? Or Open
Windows?
1. The District of Columbia Circuit Approach: Nothing Authorizes Tax
Gross- Ups
In 1993, the District of Columbia Circuit addressed the issue of tax gross-up
awards for the first time in Dashnaw v. Peia.178 In Dashnaw, the court stated
only that it "[knew] of no authority for such relief, and appellee point[ed] to
none."'179 This represents the extent of the court's reasoning for not allowing
tax gross-ups in discrimination cases. Subsequent case law exposes the
inadequacies in the court's bare reasoning. For example, in Fogg v. Gonzales
(Fogg IV), the District of Columbia Circuit once again faced the issue in a Title
VII case alleging race discrimination.' 80 Fogg attempted to distinguish his
case from Dashnaw, arguing that not only were the facts and amounts
different, but that the district judge who allowed the gross-up in his case "had
been a member of the panel that decided Dashnaw and she presumably saw no
inconsistency between the present case and that precedent." 181 Fogg also cited
Sears II, both as support for his facts and, presumably, to show the court its
(10th Cir. 1984) (reasoning only that gross-ups are included in the broad equitable discretion of
trial courts).
174. Eshelman I, 554 F.3d at 442.
175. Id. at441-42.
176. Id. at 442 (citing Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 557 (1988)). In Loeffler, the Supreme
Court recognized that "apparently all the United States Courts of Appeals that have considered
the question agree, that Title VII authorizes prejudgment interest" on backpay awards. Loeffler,
486 U.S. at 557.
177. Eshelman 11, 554 F.3d at 442. The court favorably cited Sears If in reaching its holding.
Id. at 441.
178. See Dashnaw v. Pefia, 12 F.3d 1112, 1113, 1116 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
179. Id.atl116.
180. Fogg v. Gonzales (Fogg IV), 492 F.3d 447, 449 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
181. ld.at455-56.
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error in Dashnaw of not even considering that case.' 82 Interestingly, the Fogg
IV court did not discuss the merits of Sears II or Fogg's argument. 83 Rather,
the court simply concluded that, "[o]n the basis of binding circuit precedent," it
had to reverse the district court's gross-up award.
184
As the law currently stands, tax gross-ups are not allowed by the District of
Columbia Circuit. 18 The court failed to discuss why gross-ups are
inappropriate-as compared to prejudgment interest awards, for example. Yet,
the application of the District of Columbia's approach can be limited by a fact
shared in Dashnaw and Fogg IV: the defendant in each case was the federal
government. 186 It may be that these cases represent an unwillingness to apply
tax gross-ups against the government absent an express waiver of sovereign
immunity. 187 If the District of Columbia Circuit's wariness of treading on
sovereign immunity motivated the Dashnaw and Fogg decisions, the question
of whether Title VII authorizes gross-ups against private employers in the
District of Columbia Circuit may be ripe for judicial review.188
2. The Eighth Circuit: Almost There
The Eighth Circuit has declined to award tax gross-ups to plaintiffs within
its jurisdiction on two occasions.' 8 9 Yet, the court's decisions in Hukkanen v.
International Union of Operating Engineers and Arneson v. Callahan leave
conspicuously unanswered the question of whether tax gross-ups can be
awarded against private employers.1 90 In Arneson, as in Dashnaw and Fogg
IV, the plaintiff filed suit against the federal government. 191 The Eighth Circuit
denied the award because Congress had not explicitly waived sovereign
182. Brief for Appellee/Cross Appellant at 17-19, Fogg v. Gonzales (Fogg IV), 492 F.3d 447
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (No. 05-5439). Although Sears I was decided in 1984, a full ten years before
Dashnaw, the Dashnaw opinion never mentioned it. See Dashnaw, 12 F.3d at 1114-15.
183. FoggIV, 492 F.3d at 456.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. Id. at 449 (noting that the appellant was the USMS); Dashnaw, 12 F.3d at 1113 (noting
that the appellant was the Department of Transportation).
187. See infra Part II.B.2. Dashnaw was also a per curiam opinion and is thus more
vulnerable to future attack. Dashnaw, 12 F.3d at 1113.
188. Of course, it is speculative to suggest that the District of Columbia Circuit Court based
its reasoning predominantly on sovereign immunity grounds. However, given the weak reasoning
of both Dashnaw and Fogg IV, plaintiffs seeking tax gross-ups in suits against private employers
would do well to distinguish their employers from the government agencies in Dashnaw and
Fogg.
189. Arneson v. Callahan, 128 F.3d 1243, 1247 (8th Cir. 1997); Hukkanen v. Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs, 3 F.3d 281, 287 (8th Cir. 1993).
190. Arneson, 128 F.3d at 1247 n.7 ("Because we believe Congress has not unequivocally
expressed its intention to waive the federal government's sovereign immunity from this tax
enhancement award, we need not decide whether plaintiffs may recover this type of award against
private parties."); Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 287 (failing to address this issue).
191. Arneson, 128 F.3d at 1244-45.
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immunity for gross-up awards.' 92 The defendant in Arneson, however, argued
primarily that Title VII does not allow tax gross-ups. 193 The holding on
alternative grounds may imply that the court did not wish to preclude allowing
those awards against private employers. 194 Hukkanen, meanwhile, only
addressed the inadequacy of the plaintiff's factual showing of circumstances
warranting a gross-up award at trial.195 Therefore, given an adequate showing
by the plaintiff against a private employer, the Eighth Circuit may be inclined
to allow tax gross-ups on discrimination backpay awards against private
employers.
III. USING TITLE VII'S BROAD REMEDIAL POWER THE WAY CONGRESS
INTENDED
A. Tax Gross-Up Awards Are Well Within Congress's Broad Grant of
Equitable Remedies
The Third Circuit's proposition is simple: when Congress enacted Title VII,
expanded courts' powers and plaintiffs' awards after subsequent developments,
and modeled other discrimination statutes on Title VII's remedies, it did not
intend to tie the hands of the courts in exercising proper discretion. 96 Rather,
Congress has consistently expressed its intention that courts broadly interpret
discrimination statutes.1 97 A plain-language reading of Title VII, as noted by
192. Id. at 1247; see Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310, 314-15 (1986) (noting that
unless the United States expressly waives its sovereign immunity, it is not liable for prejudgment
interest or other awards authorized by discrimination statutes). But see Loeffler v. Frank, 486
U.S. 549, 554, 556-57 (1988) (concluding that because Congress expressly waived sovereign
immunity with respect to the Postal Service by including a "sue-and-be-sued" clause in the statute
enumerating the Postal Service's general powers, the plaintiffs could collect interest awards).
193. Arneson, 128 F.3d at 1247 ("The SSA argues that tax enhancement awards are not
available under Title VII and that, if available, Congress has not waived sovereign immunity from
these awards."). The opinion stated that if Title VII did authorize the award, it was similar to a
prejudgment interest award. Id.; see supra Part I.A.4 (discussing prejudgment interest awards).
194. Cf Washington v. Kroger Co., 671 F.2d 1072, 1078 (8th Cir. 1982) ("The defendant is,
by hypothesis, the wrongdoer, and has had the use of plaintiff's money for years. We approve the
award of prejudgment interest."). Because nearly all of the circuits had permitted prejudgment
interest awards against private employers before Congress amended Title VII, the Eighth
Circuit's language in Arneson could indicate a willingness to allow tax gross-ups against private
employers under the right circumstances.
195. Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 287. Hukkanen upheld the district court's denial of a tax gross-up
award because the plaintiff failed to present evidence or give the court a "convenient way.., to
calculate the amount." Id.
196. See Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc. (Eshelman 11), 554 F.3d 426, 440 (3d Cir. 2009)
(citing Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418, 424 (1975)). Essentially, the Third
Circuit interpreted Title VII as evincing Congress's intent to give the courts a nearly limitless
range of remedies to create "a just result" for victims of discrimination. Id.
197. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 87-88 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549,
625-26 (discussing Congress's ongoing concern regarding civil rights laws). The report goes on
to state
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the Supreme Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, establishes a clear
"make-whole" purpose behind remedy provisions designed to put plaintiffs in
• . 198
the positions they would have been in but for the discrimination.
Congressional approval of prejudgment interest awards indicates that
Congress would likely endorse a similar logic in accepting tax gross-up
awards. 199 It is altogether fitting that plaintiffs should be taxed as they would
have been had they not been subjected to discrimination. 20 In this respect, the
proper interpretation of Title VII is the broad, liberally construed grant of
authority that the Third Circuit articulated in Eshelman II. 201 Although
Congress has been repeatedly presented with legislation to amend the I.R.C.
for discrimination plaintiffs, 2 its failure to address the issue adequately leaves
courts with the choice to continue the injustice worked on discrimination
plaintiffs or to fashion appropriate relief.20 3 Therefore, courts must be allowed
to consider the impact of purely monetary awards on plaintiffs if they are to
make them "whole" again.
Despite these repeated expressions of Congress'[s] view, the Supreme Court
decisions of 1989 addressed in this legislation strongly suggest that the Supreme Court
appears to have completely ceased applying [a broad interpretive] rule of construction
in civil rights cases. Departure from the established rules of statutory construction,
such as the rule favoring broad construction of civil rights laws, interferes with the
ability of Congress to express its will through legislation.
Id. at 88, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 626. The 1991 CRA was viewed by lawmakers as an
opportunity to codify this liberal rule of construction. Id.
198. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 419.
199. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 85-86, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 623-24;
see also supra note 62. It follows logically that the same money taxed in a lump sum-often at
the highest margins-is worth less than that money taxed at lower margins over time.
200. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 1, at 86, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 624 ("Title
VII authorizes the award of interest or other compensation for delay in payment of back pay and
attorneys' fees in actions against private employers as well as state and local governments."
(emphasis added)).
201. See Eshelman II, at 440.
202. See GovTrack.us, H.R. 3035: Civil Rights Tax Relief Act of 2009, http://www.
govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=hlll-3035&tab=related (last visited July 28, 2010) (noting
that the CRTRA and similar bills have failed in at least four previous sessions of Congress). The
CRTRA would, among other things, allow for civil rights plaintiffs to average lump-sum
payments over several years to offset the increased tax liability of the lump sum. See Nat'l
Employment Lawyers Ass'n, Advocacy: CRTRA, http:lwww.nela.org/NELAlindex.cfm?
event=showPage&pg=crtra (last visited July 28, 2010).
203. See, e.g., Eshelman 11, 554 F.3d at 440-41 (addressing the injustice that would result
under the I.R.C. if Eshelman were not awarded a tax gross-up); see also supra note 83 and
accompanying text.
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B. Limitations to Gross- Ups Based on Factual Distinctions
As the Third, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have demonstrated, it is necessary
to establish limitations on tax gross-up awards. 204  First, these courts are
correct that a typical Title VII case may not warrant tax gross-up awards where
the litigation is not protracted or other factors suggest an award would be
inappropriate. 20 5  Most likely, the plaintiffs support for a gross-up award
would be one of the most contentious matters for the court to decide.
When awarding backpay, courts should also take into account other
pecuniary burdens the plaintiff will suffer as a result of adverse tax
consequences. Not all income is taxed equally, and courts should consider not
only a plaintiffs income-tax liability but also any other liabilities under the
I.R.C. that a plaintiff can prove would not have been incurred but for the
discrimination.207 Courts should account for missed deductions, tax credits, or
other applicable provisions,208 as well as any economic benefits the plaintiffs
were unable to enjoy that are traceable to the employer's discrimination. 209
For example, if a plaintiff receives federal or state unemployment benefits, the
tax consequences and other economic benefits, if any, should be considered
when calculating the gross-up award.2 10
204. See Eshelman I1, 554 F.3d at 441-42 (upholding the propriety of the district court's
award and calculations); Hukkanen v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 3 F.3d 281, 287 (8th Cir.
1993) (upholding the district court's decision not to award a tax gross-up because of the
plaintiffs failure to present evidence of tax consequences); Sears v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry. (Sears), 749 F.2d 1451, 1456 (10th Cir. 1984) (considering particular factors, including age,
mortality, and position changes, in awarding a tax gross-up to members of a class).
205. See Sears II, 749 F.2d at 1456. For example, employees that would have been taxed at
the highest rate had they maintained their positions should not be allowed tax gross-ups. The
burden is on the plaintiffs to show negative tax consequences for the years in question. See
Hukkanen, 3 F.3d at 287.
206. See, e.g., Argue v. David Davis Enters., No. 02-9521, 2009 WL 750197, at *26-27
(E.D. Pa. 2009) (denying a tax gross-up award because of the plaintiff's questionable calculations
based on only one year's tax return).
207. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
208. See, e.g., GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF
EQUALITY IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 180-81 (2d ed. 2007). Courts must also take into account
the plaintiffs "[i]nterim earnings or amounts earnable with reasonable diligence." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g)(1) (2006).
209. But see, e.g., Randall v. Loflsgaarden, 478 U.S. 647, 667 (1986) (holding that an award
in a securities fraud case should not be reduced for advantageous tax benefits received by
defrauded plaintiffs during the years of investment).
210. See, e.g., Pappas v. Watson Wyatt & Co., No. 3:04CV304, 2008 WL 45385, at *11 (D.
Conn. Jan. 2, 2008) (denying a tax gross-up for COBRA contributions to reflect the plaintiff's
effective tax rate); EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1378 (S.D. Fla. 1998)
(holding that backpay should include fringe benefits like "vacation, sick pay, insurance and
retirement benefits"). Courts should take into account all of the unemployment effects of a lost
salary. The unemployment effects a lack of salary has on the employee should take into account
all the lost "salary" itself. Although backpay-award calculation is beyond the scope of this
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C. Putting the Burden of Proof on the Plaintiff
As Eshelman H holds, in order to recover, the plaintiff should bear the
burden of proving with specificity the amount of the increased tax burden.
2 11
To prevent abuse or mistake in awarding tax gross-ups, courts should require
detailed accounting calculations and records supporting a specific figure or
estimate. 212 Courts have held tax gross-ups to be untenable where calculations
are too speculative or where there is no "convenient way for the court to
calculate the amount" when announcing its judgment.21 3
This requirement is not as intimidating as it may seem because courts
already require detailed computations for backpay awards and take into
account any accrued "interim earnings" or other mitigating financial factors.
2 14
Where plaintiffs must already apply accounting principles for calculations of
backpay offsets, 2 15 calculating adverse tax consequences seems only logical. If
a plaintiff can be made substantially whole without a tax gross-up award,
courts should not grant an award that would put the plaintiff in a better
economic position than she otherwise would have been.21 6
While individual circumstances dictate the method of calculating tax gross-
ups, courts employ a general method for the calculations: (1) calculate the
taxable income of the plaintiff for the year of the award;217 (2) determine the
Comment, it is worth noting that backpay awards, when appropriate, often account for many of
the negative pecuniary consequences associated with an employee's loss of salary.
211. See Eshelman v. Agere Sys., Inc. (Eshelman 11), 554 F.3d 426, 443 (3d Cir. 2009)
(holding that the plaintiff satisfied her burden by providing expert testimony); see also Argue,
2009 WL 750197, at *26-27 (denying a tax gross-up where the expert witness's calculations did
not include all available years of tax returns). These cases demonstrate the uncertainty that
remains regarding the burden of proof required in the Third Circuit for proving the need for tax
gross-ups.
212. See Argue, 2009 WL 750197, at *27 (noting that the plaintiff did not provide "a reliable
estimate of the negative income tax consequences of his lump sum award, let alone equitable
arguments compelling such an award"). Argue is particularly relevant because it is one of the
first opinions in the Third Circuit that applied Eshelman II. See id. at *26. The requirement of
detailed, proper calculations set forth by the Eshelman 11 court was not adequately met by the
plaintiff in Argue. Id. at *26-27.
213. Hukkanen v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 3 F.3d 281, 287 (8th Cir. 1993).
214. See RUTHERGLEN, supra note 208, at 180 (discussing the requirements of 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(g)(l)).
215. See 42 U.S.C. § 198la(b)(2) (2006) (stating that compensatory damages "shall not
include backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under section 706(g)
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"). Given its make-whole scheme, it seems illogical that Congress,
while diligent enough to prevent double recovery by plaintiffs, was disinterested in the possibility
of double taxation due to large lump-sum payments taxed in a single year.
216. See, e.g., Criado v. IBM Corp., 145 F.3d 437, 446 (1st Cir. 1998) (upholding a denial of
a prejudgment interest award because the plaintiff was made whole without such an award).
217. See Loesch v. City of Philadelphia, No. 05-cv-0578, 2008 WL 2557429, at * II (E.D.
Pa. June 19, 2008). A plaintiffs "gross-up income" should include the lump-sum backpay award
as well as any other non-judgment-related earnings for the year. O'Neill v. Sears, Roebuck &
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taxes owed for that year;218 (3) determine the effective tax rate for that year;2 19
(4) determine the effective tax rate on what would have been the plaintiffs
normal, one-year salary with the discriminating employer; 22 (5) determine the
difference between the effective tax rates in a normal salary year and the lump-
sum award year; 221 and (6) multiply the lump-sum taxable income by the
difference between the effective and normal tax rates.
222
Co., 108 F. Supp. 2d 443, 448 (E.D. Pa. 2000). Thus, the award should not gross-up any
liquidated or compensatory damages. Id.
218. See Loesch, 2008 WL 2557429, at *11. For large backpay awards, the Alternative
Minumum Tax (AMT) may be implicated. See 26 U.S.C. § 55 (2008). Without discussing all of
the issues attendant to AMT calculations, it will suffice to note that the AMT will not change the
general method of calculation for tax gross-up awards. If the AMT is triggered, this will be
included as a "negative" consequence of the lump-sum backpay award.
219. SeeLoesch, 2008 WL 2557429, at *l1.
220. See id at *11 n.10 ("Defendant's estimate of itemized deductions is based on the
deductions actually taken by the Plaintiff in the tax years between 2003 and 2006 .. "). Courts
should look at the tax returns for the years when the discrimination leading to the backpay award
occurred, then determine what the plaintiff's deductions and exemptions were, and what each
year's effective tax rate would have been on the salary for those years. IRS tax-rate schedules for
each year in question should be used. Thus, when computing the normal tax rate for a plaintiff
awarded salary increases, experts should consider a plaintiffs actual deductions and exemptions
for each year in question, then apply specific yearly promotions as appropriate. For instance, if a
backpay award was calculated to assume a five-percent raise every two years, the plaintiff should
calculate each year's salary and compute the effective tax rate as appropriate. Cf Argue v. David
Davis Enters., No. 02-9521, 2009 WL 750197, at *27 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 20, 2009) ("[E]stimating the
tax impact by using one year as a comparison ignores the fact that information about more than
one year is readily available.").
221. Loesch, 2008 WL 2557429, at *11.
222. Id. A simple (and unrealistic) model illustrates this approach:
Taxable Income $1,000,000.00
Tax $200,000.00
Effective Tax Rate 20.00%
(married filing jointly)
Normal Tax Rate on "Normal Salary" 10.00%
of$100,000.00
Tax Increase 10.00%
Additional Tax on Lump Sum $100,000.00
The goal of tax gross-ups is to completely offset the negative tax burden; that is, to tax the award
year's gross income (including both backpay and the gross-up) and end up with the same after-tax
amount as if the plaintiff had continued working, was taxed yearly at the "normal" rate, and
stockpiled earnings. Obviously, adding the gross-up award would increase gross income.
Consequently, the gross-up amount would fall in the taxpayer's highest margin--or more
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Because of the complexities involved in calculating backpay gross-ups,
courts should instruct juries on the adverse effects of lump-sum awards.
Calculations should be as straightforward and complete as possible to
demonstrate adequately the propriety of a gross-up award.224 Yet, such factual
showings should not be so specific as to allow only those calculations that
225include no element of speculation. A plaintiff should be able to meet the
burden of proof through expert testimony or other affirmative evidence that
delineates for the court any complex calculations, non-obvious accounting
methods, and applicable I.R.C. provisions. The burden of proof should rest on
the plaintiff, not crush her. Ultimately, the plaintiff must convince the court
that only a tax gross-up award can make her "whole."
IV. CONCLUSION
In over one hundred years of Civil Rights legislation, Congress has
reiterated time and again its intent to protect victims of discrimination and to
restore them-as best as possible-to their rightful place in society. Over
time, with both successes and failures, both Congress and the courts have
recognized that making a victim "whole" often requires monetary
compensation. The Third and Tenth Circuits have used the broad equitable
power bestowed on the courts under Title VII, and the liberal construction
which Congress intended, to award tax gross-ups for lump-sum backpay
awards to offset undue tax burdens. 226 Both circuits looked to the plaintiffs'
particular circumstances before determining that only tax gross-up awards
could make the plaintiffs whole. Conversely, the District of Columbia Circuit,
citing only a lack of applicable case law in the area, expressly rejected tax
gross-up awards for a prevailing plaintiffs discrimination claim.227 By blindly
adhering to this position, the District of Columbia Circuit ignores the
realistically, would bump the taxpayer into an even higher margin-shifting the effective tax rate
upward. Thus, the $1,100,000.00 would not be taxed at a twenty percent effective rate, but
perhaps at twenty-two percent, once more leaving the plaintiff with less than if she had been paid
and taxed "normally."
223. See Bruce A. Fredrickson, Taxation, Back Pay, and Attorneys' Fees in Employment
Cases, GEO. U. L. CENTER CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., 2003 WL 22002094, at *3 (arguing in
support ofjury instructions and on the taxability of awards in discrimination cases).
224. See Robert W. Wood, Getting Additional Damages for Adverse Tax Consequences, 123
TAX NOTES 423, 428 (2009).
225. See Loesch, 2008 WL 2557429, at *I I ("[T]he mere fact that there is an element of
speculation involved in calculating the taxes that would have been paid on lost wages does not
provide a sound reason for denying the award."). Using only a few years of tax returns to
estimate the plaintiff's average, normal tax rate, for example, may be permissible where the
litigation is prolonged, the discrimination had taken place over many years, and where tax returns
or other documents for the years in question cannot be located. Cf Argue, 2009 WL 750197, at
*26-27 (holding that a tax gross-up was not warranted where the plaintiff's expert failed to
employ actual tax returns available to the court in his calculations for the years in dispute).
226. See supra Parts I.C.I, I.C.3.
227. See supra Part I.C.2.
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legislative history and intent of Congress, the spirit of discrimination remedies
as advanced by the Supreme Court, and common sense. Barring explicit
legislative change, courts in the future should adopt the reasoning of the
Eshelman H court when determining the propriety of tax gross-ups in Title VII
backpay awards.
